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BOOK REVIEWS
I Too, Nicodemus.

By Curtis Bok.
1946. Pp. vii, 349.

New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Reviewing this book is like trying to catch half a dozen frogs at once.
It consists of a couple of exceptionally powerful short stories, a strong
short story half finished and then capped with a bit of unimpressive
news reporting, a number of courtroom episodes, a chapter of jurisprudence valuable principally to demonstrate that the author, Bok, excels
as a writer rather than as a juristic thinker, several main theses or bills
of goods which the author wants to sell to his readers, and a portrayal
of the ordinary daily life of an interesting man, who is also a judge.
This may not be all there is in the book, but these are the things which
stick in the mind of the reviewer. All this is held together into something resembling a novel by the fact that most of it appears chronologically in the life of the judge, whose name is given as Ulen, but whom
we sometimes suspect of being Bok. Perhaps he should have a hyphenated name and be called Ulen-Bok. The author himself tells us that the
book is intended neither as a novel nor a collection of court stories, but as
something between the two. The friends, family life, religion, and even
the vacations of the judge are brought in, so the author asserts, because
these have to do with his conduct as a judge. The author puts it a little
more impressively, but that is what he means, and that is one of his
theses or bills of goods. From this we gather that Bok has been under
the influence of a group of modernistic juristic thinkers called Realists,
for that is also one of their major theses or bills of goods. It is odd that
Bok, revealed here by his handiwork as a mystic and a deeply religious
man, should have been so much influenced by a school of jurists who are
extreme materialists. Bok is not willing to confess the influence, as
witness the fact that on page 47 he writes, "Take a man and a bench.
Put them together and shake well before using. Serve at ten o'clock
each morning. The state of the stomach after dosage constitutes justice,
and nothing else does." This is a version (somewhat fuddled) of that
extreme form of Realism known as Gastronomical Jurisprudence. But
the author puts these words not in the mouth of Ulen (Bok) but of a
minor character, one Nathan, a lawyer, whose ideas Bok does not necessarily sponsor.
The author puts into the book enough about sex to insure the book's
popularity. The reviewer is not sure whether this was done with an
eye on the market, or in an effort at an appearance of unconscious simplicity in accepting life as it is; at any rate the reviewer has the strong
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impression that the simplicity is not an unstudied one. Thus one of
the judge's children, in a simple little family scene, is reeling off a jargon
(p. 72) he has picked up from radio advertisement; and he begins,
"Fertilized eggs from fecund hens." At another point (p. 63) Bok
accounts for the fact that a father did not go into the room where his
small adopted son was having an arm set, on the striking theory that
men know it is wise not to suffer in each other's presence. "It went
back to their both being bulls and each having to know what kind of
bull it was he had to deal with." Ho, hum. The pun as to the nature
of this proposition is a bit too obvious for the reviewer to set it forth.
On the other hand the story of Jon and Sara Sander is partly a
drama of sex, but it is something of an altogether different sort from
the kind of thing just referred to; it is a powerful story drawn out of
life, depressing but extraordinarily gripping, and done with a mastery
which leaves no doubt that Bok at his best is a writer of first rank. This
superlative story has an importance in the book beyond its own great
worth; it is used in such a way as to impress upon the reader another
of Bok's theses, that law is not a dry science but part of life. The
story does not begin in the courtroom. For a while it looks like a separate story in the middle of the book. The writer seems to abandon the
doings of Ulen, and starts a story of the life of Jon and Sara Sander,
which he develops from their childhood. It is only after they have murdered Sara's new born baby that their drama moves into Ulen's courtroom and becomes a murder case. Nor does it stop in the courtroom.
It goes on from there, and we see the effect of the judge's decision on
the lives involved. Thus we are left with an impression of life flowing
through a court, rather than an impression of cases having a complete
existence there. The writer in this story reaches a height; the story has
greatness, the thesis it supports is true, and the process by which the
story illustrates the thesis is more powerful than mere argument. It
is true that one character, Sara's father, is made to behave to fit the
story, rather than allowed to behave as such a father would behave. Such
a father would quietly have kept an eye on Sara after she deserted her
home, but that might have prevented the story from happening, hence
this father did not do so. But novelists who have been ranked among
the greatest (off hand I have in mind Dickens and Emily Bronte) have
gone to maddening excesses in making their characters behave at times
to fit a story. Bok's small erring in that direction can be the more readily forgiven by reason of the quality of the story thus furthered.
A story of a vastly different sort, but to the reviewer's taste as superlatively good as that of Jon and Sara Sander, is the story of the life of
Ulen's small daughter, Julia, and her death at the age of four. This
exquisite account of a little child's doing, and her father's ability to join
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his mind with hers and be her comrade, show to advantage Bok's fine
intuitive understanding of what goes on in the minds of diverse sorts of
people, big and little. His strong mystic streak comes into play when
the man and the little girl go on an excursion together, he in a dream,
she in her fancy, and their conversation afterwards skillfully leaves the
implication that the dream and the fancy were identical. This mystic
theme deepens in power when they go on a later excursion together when
she has just been killed and he knocked unconscious by a drunken driver,
and the relation of the earlier excursion to the later one appears. The
delicate skill with which all this is molded into a story cannot be shown
in a review, it can only be declared. Bok has a little harder time accounting for the presence of this story in his book; he does so on the basis
that it is part of the life of the judge, .which has a bearing on what he is
as a judge.
The book includes a chapter (the next to the last) of just plain jurisprudence in which the author boldly sets forth his own philosophy of
law without the subterfuge of speaking through any of his characters.
As intimated before, Bok does not emerge as a first class juristic thinker.
Unhappily more laymen are likely to read this chapter on jurisprudence
by Bok, who doesn't know much about it, than are likely to read books
by Pound, who does. Bok has'some good ideas, well put, but not all of
his ideas call for such praise. He has the Realist's usual suspicion of
rules (p. 324). There is no use in the reviewer refuting or applauding
this position; refutation and applause in abundance are to be found in
voluminous current juristic writing. Bok goes along with the Realists
in condemning the idea of "government of laws and not of men," and
in so doing displays no comprehension of what is packed into that phrase.
He himself has gone far to demonstrate that law has to do with ongoing
human life, but he is singularly blind to the breadth of the human experience which has gone into the making of this principle which he
curtly labels "sonorous nonsense" (p. 327). A better informed Bok,
with his strong feeling for life and for people, could perform a service
by translating the dry historical account of humanity's struggle against
tyranny back into terms of human beings, their lives, their hopes, their
suffering, their wars, and the rivers of their blood which had to be shed
to bring into being what is here called "sonorous" and "nonsense." Bok
thinks that most people are decent enough to have an instinctive dislike
for laws. This idea is familiar enough to anyone acquainted with the
New Testament, but whether people are decent enough to live without
them is not even debatable, as witness our murderous conduct in the
field of internationl relations, where the compulsion of law is lacking.
A suspicion of the writer's good judgment intrudes upon the enjoyment
of his book by anyone who has been asked to review it when such a
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reader comes across such statements as that law will be adopted internationally when well enough administered nationally (p. 329). There
are few national administrations of law which do not already compare
favorably with our international lawlessness. But perhaps this is mere
intrepidity in a field where the author is unencumbered by much knowledge. Bok's great strength is his feeling for the personal in law; he
would have contributed more if he had added his philosophy to that
which we already have instead of impeaching much the value of which
he has missed. The author's persistent belittling of right and -wrong
would seem to the uninitiated to be individual perversity. It still seems
to the reviewer to be perversity, although such perversity has grown
familiar by reason of the fact that a whole school of "modern" thought
has made this perversity part of its creed. The quotes about "modern"
are added because there is really nothing new about the thought that
right isn't right. Bok doesn't really believe this himself; he is a partisan
of "intuitive good living" (p. 327) ; and without some distinction between right and wrong "intuitive good living" would become mere intuitive living. The reviewer wonders if one of Bols own characters
hasn't run away with him; if the amazing fact that there never once
crossed Sara Sander's mind the idea that right and wrong were involved
in her conduct does not demonstrate the consequences of ruling out the
existence and value of right and wrong.
Getting back to the book as a whole; one source of great strength in
Bok's writing lies in a rather rare quality, rare at least in those no
longer young; the ability to see the fascination and mystery in the commonplace. Life appears to remain fresh to him, its newness not worn
off. An outstanding weakness seems to be that he puts down his ideas
as they come, without much discrimination between the good ones and
the bad ones, those of value and those without. Sometimes Bok appears
to be laboring for effect; not that the best of authors do not do so, but
they manage so well that the effect and not the laboring attracts the
attention. At other times the book is so strong that one grows unconscious of the book and through it looks out at life illumined by it.
It would not be in order to close without mention of the idea which
gives the book its name; an idea which Ulen, the judge, employs in the
effect he tries for when he passes judgment upon those before him;
the idea that people can reimagine their lives and start anew. What
success Ulen had in trying for this is revealed in the last chapter, the
aftermath of the cases he tried. The author laughs at us a bit, and
indulges the feeling of futility to which sensitive men are sometimes
subject, in the final scene. Sara Sander has had at least something of
a rebirth; her talent has found expression in a statue which is on ex-

19471

BOOK REVIEWS

hibit; Ulen has seated himself to contemplate it; Sara, overcome by
curiosity, peeks around a corner to see how it affects him, and finds he
has fallen asleep.
FRANK

HANFT.

University of North Carolina
School of Law
Chapel Hill, N. C.
The Process of International Arbitration. By Kenneth S. Carlston.
New York: Columbia University Press. 1946. Pp. xiv, 318. $4.50.
Wars have introduced, or produced, the atomic age; but war is not
the only method which has been used with increasing frequency during
the last fifty years for resolving controversies between sovereignties.
Writhin the same period and for a hundred years before, there has also
been an increase both in the number and importance of international disputes settled by adjudication. The Anglo-Saxon peoples may feel some
pride in the part they have taken in this development; the Jay Treaty in
1794 between Great Britain and the United States revived a process
which had been practically dead for three centuries. Since 1850 arbitration proceedings between these two countries have been notably successful even where national feelings were aroused. Other nations have
used the arbitration process for the settlement of thousands of claims.
The Spanish-American states might now be an American Balkan area
had it not been for the frequency with which they turn to impartial
tribunals for the solution of their difficulties. From the history of this
one hundred and fifty years of arbitration practice certain conclusions
can be drawn as to the procedural rules followed by international judicial
tribunals. W~ith travel between nations becoming simpler every year,
more international contacts and more international claims are certain to arise; the prospect is for an increasing resort to international
adjudications.
The Process of International Arbitration is the result of study in
this field. The title does not use the term arbitration as meaning something different from adjudication; the author recognizes that there is
no fundamental distinction, and applies the same rules whether the tribunal is called a court made up of judges or a commission made up of
arbitrators. The book does not attempt to cover the whole subject of
procedure in international adjudication. The problem of evidence is not
dealt with at all, and there are only a few suggestions about the case
and the counter-case, the pleadings inwhich the litigants present their
dispute to the tribunal- Scattered through the volume are a number of
suggestions upon the drafting of the compromis, or arbitration treaty,
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suggestions which should help avoid various difficulties which have not
always been avoided in the past.
The author's interest is in those fundamental rules of procedure
upon the observance of which the binding effect of the decision of an
international tribunal is most likely to depend in his opinion. He discusses the minimum procedural requisites for a valid award, a tribunal
free of fraud or collusion, an opportunity to each party to present his
case to the full tribunal, and a final decision supported by a public
statement of reasons. A failure to meet any one of these requirements
is recognized as justification for treating the award as a nullity; there
is a due process of law in such tribunals as in the courts of the United
States. This is an element of strength in the international adjudication
process, but the weakness inherent in the process as long as it is on a
purely voluntary basis without compulsory jurisdiction in an established
world wide judicial system, is also made apparent. Since no executive
power is available to enforce the award, the practical result is to constitute the unsuccessful litigant as his own court of last resort, to decide
whether the minimum procedural standards have been met. Or a litigant
state can withdraw its representative from an arbitration tribunal before
a hearing is complete, and thus automatically deprive the tribunal of
jurisdiction by making impossible the necessary hearing by a full court.
Such an action would presumably be a violation of the arbitration agreement, but that fact would not validate an award made in disregard of
the rule requiring a full hearing.
The right of a tribunal to grant a rehearing for error of law or newly
discovered evidence is discussed; as long as the tribunal is still in existence it may properly re-open a case and revise its decision. One
chapter deals with the doctrine of "essential error," the concept that an
award may justifiably be repudiated as founded on basic error, something
which cannot be classified as lack of jurisdiction, nor fraud, nor any
failure to meet the minimum procedural standards, but is yet error so
serious and obvious that it annuls the award. The discussion leaves the
impression that a whole volume could be devoted to the subject without
clarifying it and that possibly the doctrine is itself fundamentally erroneous. Only two points are clear on the subject; first the limits of any
such doctrine are most shadowy, and, second, the doctrine, without any
practical necessity, offers the vaguest, and so the easiest argumentative
justification to the unsuccessful litigant who is looking for an escape
from obligations. The doctrine has not been frequently applied by international tribunals; its disappearance would strengthen international law.
About half of the book is taken up with a discussion of the jurisdictional limits of international tribunals. This is probably the most valuable feature of the book for reference purposes. Such jurisdiction is
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based exclusively on the consent of the parties, expressed or implied in
the treaty or compromis upon which the proceeding is heard. The compromis specifies the question or questions submitted, and thus limits the
tribunal to the specified subject matter; it may also provide what facts
are to be treated as relevant, prescribe certain rules of law to be followed,
or contain many other terms, all of which are customarily treated as conditions upon the submission consent, and so as limitations upon the
jurisdiction. If any of these limitations be disregarded, and the defect
is not waived by failure to object within a reasonable time, the decision
may be treated as of no effect.
The soundness of this conclusion is obvious upon the most superficial examination. Where jurisdiction is based solely upon a limited
consent given by a sovereign state an award disregarding any such limitation cannot be binding upon the state. Equally obvious, however, is
the proposition that the arbitral tribunal set up by a valid treaty must
be allowed to determine its own jurisdiction when the problem is raised.
The only alternative would be to hold that whenever either party chose
to raise the question of jurisdiction, the tribunal, lacking authority to
pass upon that question, must abdicate. Such a rule would defeat the
purpose of the parties in setting up the tribunal.
The author of course recognizes the problem created by this conflict; very likely it is one of the principal reasons which led him to
write the book. In municipal law we meet this situation by allowing
the court to pass upon its own jurisdiction, subject to review on appeal.
In international law there is as yet no organized appellate jurisdiction;
the only possible solution is to allow the tribunal to pass upon its own
jurisdiction in order to make an award, and to leave to the unsuccessful
litigant state, in exercise of its sovereignty, the decision as to whether
it will respect the award or refuse to do so on the basis of excess of
jurisdiction. It is possibly surprising that in comparatively few cases
have defeated states taken the latter course; once the problem has been
submitted to an international court or commission, the disposition is to
carry out its award, though the state may at the same time announce
that in its opinion the tribunal acted in excess of its authority.
The distinction between municipal law and international law in the
solution of this problem is not so clear as might be supposed. In
municipal law, too, we finally reach a court of last resort, which must
determine its own jurisdiction without possibility of judicial review.
Enforcement of its decree must be left to another government organ,
which may be unsympathetic with the court's decision. When the United
States Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgiz, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 515
(1832), held a Georgia statute invalid and accordingly granted a writ
of habeas corpus to release the petitioner who was convicted under the
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statute, President Jackson is reported to have said, "John Marshall has
made his decision; now let him enforce it." At any rate, the petitioner
was not released, but served out his full sentence in the Georgia penitentiary, according to Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1942),
p. 123. Such a failure of justice is rare, however, in a well organized
political system, as witness the recent prompt surrender, pursuant to a
court decree, of all claims to the office of the governor of the state of
Georgia, by one who had shown every inclination to support his claim
by the use of state police. He felt that defiance of the well established
judicial authorities would endanger his political future.
The book is for the most part a discussion of individual cases
illustrating the topics of the several chapters, with one or two general
sections introducing each chapter. It would be strengthened if each
chapter concluded with a comprehensive analysis of the problem as developed in the cases. The most important paragraphs in this book are
those which emphasize the necessity of taking some steps to establish
the international judicial system on a firmer basis to give it more nearly
the same authority over fully independent and sovereign states that our
courts have over litigants. The author speaks of the resolution of the
American Bar Association in 1944 proposing the establishment of an
International Judicial System, with circuit courts sitting for specified
terms in the capital of each member nation. This is an ambitious program, but certainly no more than is needed. He would also give the
International Court of Justice appellate jurisdiction in international disputes, limited to the review of serious errors of law, such as excess of
jurisdiction, a step which would do much to deprive the unsuccessful
litigant of the right to repudiate the award.
The soundest basis for the authority of a court is a record of successful performance creating a tradition of respect for its decision. It
is not essential that the individual litigant feel such respect; if the society
of which he is a part respects the court, there is pressure upon him to
submit. Our one world will not continue much longer without a similar
unity of political organization. A strong argument can be made that
one of the steps in that direction which is now most practicable would
be along the lines suggested by the author, strengthening by a better
organization the system of international adjudication which already has
a respectable history of successful operation.
Joust

University of North Carolina
School of Law
Chapel Hill, N. C.

P.

DALZELL.

